Japan and nuclear energy (2) 
Pluto-Kun shows that drinking water with plutonium is not bad for your health. The test: none of the characters who has done any damage has occurred.
end of the eighties Japan had a nuclear industry was U.S. envy. He was 16 boiling water reactors and pressurized water 15 and had seven more plants under construction or already planned, which should be operational from 1992. Japan built plants in 60% of time U.S. and used since the late 70's had learned to cut costs and built power cheaper than Americans. To top it off, its plants operated at more than 90% capacity.
Then came the 90 and the snack bar collapsed. Housing bubble burst and stock market of the eighties and Japan entered into an economic crisis that has not really come out. The political system after 1945 was based on the hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party, which was neither democratic nor liberal era, began to water. The Japanese began to question whether bureaucrats really were as intelligent, selfless and honest as they were selling. The answer was no and in this context, began airing nuclear accidents in the 70 or 80 would have remained in silence. And to top it had a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kabun Muto ("gross" rather have had that surname) in 1993 dropped to the moment of truth, to show that they have eggs, nuclear weapons is important. He said alluding to the threat posed by North Korea, but there are things that should not be said publicly. Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata finished arranging it in June 1994, when he acknowledged in parliament that Japan had the capability to produce nuclear weapons. To end to fix things in 1993 had begun the construction of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The plant would allow Japan to be more independent supply of nuclear fuel. But he also would produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Many analysts believe that Japan is a paranuclear state, ie a state that has no nuclear weapons, but could make them as soon as you propose.
As I said, the nineties were the years when the Japanese realized that nuclear energy was not as well managed as they were told, well, no nuclear energy or other things in the country. Although it was not until the middle of the decade the Japanese began to learn about these things, accidents and their concealment had been happening for several years.
In 1978, precisely in Fukushima, several rods from a reactor went out of their site, but the company reported, because at that time was not required to notify the Government those little accidents. In 1981 300 workers were subjected to excessive doses of radiation as a result of the broken bars in the Tsuruga nuclear power, nothing transpired. Kei Sugaoka In 1989, a nuclear engineer who worked for a TEPCO nuclear plant, asked his superiors to delete a video that they would submit to regulators images appearing on some pipes cracked. In 1995 in the experimental reactor Monju, which belongs to the company Donen, there was a flight of eight tons of sodium. A Donen those caught them trying not to see the videos the most serious of the leak. Two years later, of Donen tried to conceal information about a fire in central Tokaimura, in which 37 workers were subjected to low levels of reaction. The doses that were low at the Donen said.
With these disasters, it became increasingly difficult to cover, they took on more prominence to the voice of the Citizen's Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), an organization opposed to nuclear power, which was founded in 1975 and is independent of special interests political or business. The IASB try provide people with accurate information on nuclear energy and has played a growing role in disseminating nuclear accidents that occur. Indeed, without the CNIC knew even less about the accidents that have occurred in Japan. One curiosity is that the Japanese, with or without CNIC CNIC, held an ambiguous position on nuclear power: the 55'1% are favorable to their promotion and only 17% abolish it, but the only 24'8% considered safe in Japan and 65.9% are concerned about their safety. One would say that the government propaganda about the inevitability of nuclear energy has become successful, but at the same time Japanese are not stupid and have realized in the hands of what is illegal.
Certainly a way that made the Government to counter the bad press of nuclear energy was to create an animated character, Pluto-Kun. Pluto-Kun is peaceful and that would be like dynamite, it helps a lot man. Also note that you can drink, but inhaling it is not advisable and if its bad ill put it, they do not serve for nothing, because to be effective must have a degree of purity unattainable for bad ... Yes, after all going to be that the Japanese government thinks its citizens are idiots.
In September 1999 there was one of the worst accident so far. In the central Tokaimura some workers ill-prepared and without the necessary technical skills, enriched uranium manipulated without precise security measures and caused a chain reaction. Two of the workers died later from radiation effects and nearly 700 people were affected by excessive radiation dose.
The government reacted as governments often react, by enacting laws, which is easier than real action. In December 1999 the Japanese government passed the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster and the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Fuel and Reactors. Special Act established the chain of command in case of nuclear disaster and forced operators to have contingency plans in case of disaster. The Law for the Regulation introduced tighter controls on the handling of radioactive materials, because what happened in Tokaimura had revealed that there was some joke in practice.
Previous laws were accompanied by the establishment in 2001 of the Agency for Nuclear and Industrial Safety. The Agency's mission is to monitor the nuclear energy in Japan. The Ministry of Industry and Trade which is a strong supporter of nuclear energy and is composed of bureaucrats coming mainly from the races of law and economics. I think I've said everything about their impartiality and effectiveness, right? There is also a Nuclear Safety Commission under the Office of the Prime Minister and composed of researchers and experts on nuclear issues. The Commission deals with nuclear safety regulations and makes recommendations. But, and this is important, it conducts inspections and has no supervisory duties.
In 2002 the Basic Law was enacted Energy Policy. The Act established three basic policies: 1) To ensure energy supply stable, 2) Respect for the environment, 3) Use of free market mechanisms, agreeing with the two previous policies. The Act required the Government to develop a Basic Energy Plan that would set guidelines for the supply and demand for energy until 2030. The Plan was prepared in October 2003. The Plan called for reducing energy dependence up to 30%, halving CO2 emissions of households and 70% of the energy came from sources that might not lead to CO2 emissions. To meet these objectives, the Plan betting heavily on nuclear energy. Would have to build 14 new nuclear plants between 2003 and 2030. Existing ones operate at 90% capacity. Energy by 2030 provide half of all electricity consumed in the country.
Despite all these laws so beautiful, the reality of nuclear power in Japan was far more worrisome. In August 2002 it was discovered that the now famous TEPCO had falsified inspection certificates and tried to conceal cracks in the pipes of its reactors in 13 of its 17 plants. TEPCO was forced to temporarily close their plants. The prank cost the equivalent of 1,900 million dollars. In 2004, five workers died in an explosion in Mihama-3. The subsequent investigation exposed shortcomings in the inspection of nuclear plants. "Gaps or collusion? Finally, in July 2007 (I'm skipping some less important incidents that occurred in the interim) an earthquake of 6.8 struck the center of Kashiwazaki Kariwa, also owned by TEPCO (this company really should consider changing activities and engage the ludo board manufacturing, because it is jinxed) and produced radioactive water leaks and burst pipes. Damages were contained within the plant, but said they put in constructing nuclear power stations in a seismic zone may not be one of the smartest ideas to one you can think of.
And as occurred these events, some Japanese politicians were playing with the idea that their country might one day have nuclear weapons. In April 2002 the President of the Liberal Party, Ichiro Ozawa said Japan could make thousands of warheads with plutonium extracted from its power and give the Chinese when they put silly. That could have stayed as a political opponent doe, furious because pilla cacho. More serious is that the next month, the Chief of Cabinet of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said the Japanese Constitution did not prohibit nuclear weapons, if it was for defensive purposes, and may be reached at a time when the world situation and required public that the country had nuclear weapons. The poleémica that ensued was so strong, he had to retract. Adding fuel to the fire, that great friend of world peace was the U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney said in March 2003 that the development of nuclear missiles by North Korea could trigger an arms race in East Asia and force Japan to reconsider its policy with regard to nuclear weapons. Although later the Prime Minister Koizumi repeated on several occasions that Japan would not break with its three nonnuclear principles (or should say with two non-nuclear principles, since not to authorize the presence of nuclear weapons in soil had failed from the beginning?), one is left with the impression that the temptation to possess nuclear weapons is there in some corner of the minds of Japanese politicians, as a last resort against a nuclear North Korea and unpredictable a rising China, which is frightening.
With all this, it is not surprising that Japanese society react to the early twenty-first century against nuclear power, abandoning its traditional passivity. Suddenly finding a community to accept the building in the vicinity of a nuclear power became a problem. The Federation of Bar Associations of Japan in May 2002 called for the cancellation the construction of plants Kaminoseki 1 and 2. The governor of Fukui Prefecture in 2003 warned that 15 nuclear plants in the prefecture and it seemed an exaggeration and would not tolerate more. The nuclear industry has launched a search for places where civil society is weaker or local governments need more subsidies to build their plants there. Yet in a country with a civil society such as the Japanese put in about half of the time they encounter significant opposition to building nuclear power plants in a given locality.
And amid all this damage occurred in Fukushima ... This entry stop and leave you a link to an interview that appeared in "La Vanguardia" with a Russian engineer who understands something central and nuclear accidents, and that not in vain, worked in Chrenobyl.
http://www.lavanguardia.es/internacional/20110317/54129422489/andreyev-en-la-industria-nuclear-no-hay-organismos-independientes.html
